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Death by ‘African’ Democracy: Killing Consequences 
of Western Power Prognosis 
Stephen Vertigans ∗ 
Abstract: »Tod durch ‘afrikanische’ Demokratie. Die tödlichen Folgen der west-
lichen Machtprognosen«. American enthusiasm for promoting democracy has 
waned since the longer term consequences of the 2003 invasion of Iraq became 
apparent. The neo-cons misplaced confidence in the superiority of their ideals 
appeared to blind them to lessons from history. Indeed, they might have been 
more cautious about encouraging electoral transfers of power had they studied 
experiences following the post-colonial imposition of democracy. This paper 
draws out some of those lessons, arguing that examples of newly independent 
sub Saharan African nations highlighted the lag between the notion of univer-
sal suffrage and levels of mutual interdependence that enable stable and se-
cure transitions of power. The lag legacy continues to cast a considerable shad-
ow over sub Saharan African politics resulting in elections being accompanied 
by killings in the pursuit of power by plebiscite. Despite complicity in the roots 
of these political problems Western governments and international institutions 
continue with their ‘hopeful prognosis’. Rather than confront underlying fail-
ings, blame is localised, directed at corruption and ‘big men’. Such targeting 
fails to understand that these factors are indicative of wider problems requiring 
deeper rooted exploration and consideration. Hence figurational insights are 
applied in order to gain a broader understanding of long term social processes 
and activities that result in failures to entrench democracy within political ar-
rangements. Particular attention is placed upon interweaving balances of pow-
er, competition and cooperation and we/I which are applied to a number of 
case studies including South Sudan, Nigeria and Kenya. 
Keywords: Competition, democracy, established, figuration, functional democ-
ratisation, mutual interdependence, outsiders, power, Sub-Saharan Africa. 
                                                             
∗  Stephen Vertigans, School of Applied Social Studies, Robert Gordon University, Aberdeen, 
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1.   Introduction1 
Throughout modern history, western governments and international institutions 
have promoted, and on occasion enforced, democracy as the panacea for a 
variety of problems in other parts of the world. Stemming from the build-up to 
independence from colonial control through to contemporary solutions for 
economic stagnation, corruption and conflict, the remedial potential of the 
popular plebiscite continues to resonate within northern hemisphere circles. 
The disastrously ill-informed imposition of democracy in Iraq in 2003 is the 
most recent high profile example to neglect deep rooted systemic problems. For 
instance, Dodge (2003) highlights the significance of embedded problems such 
as the long standing use of state violence, use of patronage to secure loyalties 
and the deliberate exacerbation of ethnic and communal demarcations. Moreo-
ver, although Saddam Hussein was held to be the cause of the widespread 
political violence, Dodge points to the initial weaknesses in the British attempt 
to create an absolutist-monarchical nation-state out of three former Ottoman 
provinces. These flaws were not addressed resulting in Hussein’s regime being 
more symptomatic of wider processes than their cause. Yet the projected salv-
ing solution of democracy as an imported panacea remains. Confidence in the 
building and healing powers of democracy may have been more guarded if 
much greater attention had been placed upon early African examples in pro-
cesses towards political independence. This early phase of democracy failed to 
achieve either long-term, broad, popular mandates or widespread political 
engagement through the ballot box. Today Lynch and Crawford (2011, 277) 
argue for “greater attention to how a ‘right to vote’ for a choice of political 
parties can be translated into the realization of less centralized power, greater 
material inequality and less human insecurity across the sub-continent”. As 
Mansfield and Snyder (1995) noted twenty years ago, the process of democra-
tization can be dangerous, resulting in a period of instability and violence. 
In this paper attention is placed upon gaining social scientific insight into 
the conditions in which democracy has been (re)introduced within African 
countries, to enhance understanding about connections between the implemen-
tation of the populist method of power participation and violent outcomes. 
Emphasis is placed upon different examples including South Sudan, Kenya and 
Nigeria. In South Sudan, the newest African state, elections and independence 
were introduced and have been succeeded by a brutal civil war. The first suc-
cessful transfer of Nigerian power from the losing incumbent to the electoral 
                                                             
1  Thanks to the organisers and participants at the Changing Power Relations and the Drag 
Effects of Habitus conference and subsequently the journal reviewers. I also want to 
acknowledge conversations with, and comments from, Cas Wouters which have helped 
shape my thoughts. 
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winner happened in 2015. However, violence continues to accompany elections 
and conflict continues within north eastern and south eastern regions. Until 
2007 Kenya had been considered to be home to a progressing democracy. 
Following a heavily contested election rioting and violence erupted and 1300 
people were killed and 600,000 displaced. 
By applying contributions from figurational sociology, attention shifts from 
one dimensional explanations that range from blaming the legacy of colonial-
ism to the personal characteristics of political leaders. Instead the argument 
proposed here is that the likelihood of democracy becoming an integral part of 
power distribution depends in large part upon how power and dependency 
interact with other facets of development, most notably rising levels of compe-
tition and cooperation and we/I. 
2.  Failing to Explain the ‘Failures’ of ‘African’ Democracy 
Accounts for the failures of African plebiscites can be broadly categorised into 
explanations that ostensibly either blame Africans or the West. The former 
includes excessive emphasis on competing tribal, ethnic and religious loyalties 
which spill over into violence. Despite the wide resonance of this argument, 
some of the more peaceful African countries such as Ghana have diverse mixes 
while one of the most violent countries in Somalia has minimal ethnic diversi-
ty. Tribalism has been identified as the cause both of conflict and failure of 
democracy in the form of primordialist explanation. However, this argument 
has a certain irony because, as Thomson (2016) explains, tribal identification 
became more bounded during colonialism. Because of the manner in which 
tribes were shaped, the sense to which the conceptual application has negative 
connotations and the failure to capture the multiplicities of behaviours, I shall 
be following Thomson’s (2016) application of the term. Consequently in this 
paper ethnicity, rather than tribe, is applied as a more accurate, detached expla-
nation to describe interlocking, overlapping, diverse identities. 
In countries with religious tensions such as Nigeria, denominational compo-
sition has been identified as the base for conflict. However, despite the extent 
of religious commitment in the continent, religion is relatively rarely at the 
heart of conflict and is not the root cause. Moreover, as I explain below religion 
can also be included within part of the neo patrimonialism mix. 
Weaknesses in African societies more generally have also been attributed to 
political and moral failings of leaders rather than systemic issues. Instead as 
Chabal and Deloz (1999) have reported, change at the top does not necessarily 
alter arrangements. Leaders have different styles, discourses, personalities and 
supporters. However, violence and democracy continued to be seemingly in-
compatible bedfellows. 
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The alterative view point posits the failures of democracy within a broader 
narrative that traces the roots of contemporary problems to colonialism, the 
destruction of existing social relations and constraints and the reshaping of 
local dynamics. Such a viewpoint is not without problems. Williams (2011) 
argues that focussing upon colonialism fails to explain why the most devastat-
ing conflicts within African societies occurred in the 1980s and 1990s, twenty 
and thirty years after independence. 
At this point I should stress that the central thread through this paper does 
not argue that these broad explanations hold no relevance. My argument is not 
that the above factors are necessarily absent, rather that they feature alongside 
other aspects which collectively provide more rounded insights into outcomes. 
Moreover, the dark sides of attempts at promoting and establishing democracy 
should not hide electoral transformations over recent years. Lynch and Craw-
ford (2011) highlight how alongside ‘democratic rollbacks’ and mindful of 
differences between countries and complexities, sub-Saharan Africa is typically 
more democratic today, and remains a supported concept within populations. 
Competitive democracies are more prevalent, power is being transferred 
through popular voting such as the previously entrenched Gambian President 
Yahya Jammeh, who ruled for 22 years before reluctantly ceding power after 
defeat at the ballot box. There has been a gradual shifting to formal rules and 
controls such as those insisting on two term presidential terms in Nigeria and 
reliance on constitutional framework rather than presidential power. Hunting-
ton’s (1991) conviction that a state can only be classified as a democracy if 
there are two turnovers of government can be more confidently applied to 
Africa. Alongside these changes, concerns remain about the widespread lack of 
accountability in-between elections. And as Lynch and Crawford (2011) ex-
plain when referring to the situation when the then Nigerian President 
Obasanjo was prevented from competing for a third term, the subsequent elec-
tion was marred by extraordinary levels of vote rigging and intimidation. Op-
timism has often been replaced by pessimism. Moreover, as Thomson (2016) 
points out, some of the claims for democratic progress tend to overlook that 
places often put forward as being at the forefront, such as Botswana, Namibia 
and South Africa, are dominated by one party electoral landslides. Hence the 
perceived political stability is also indicative of a lack of representative democ-
racy for sections of the population who do not have a realistic opportunity of 
electing a government. 
My starting position in examining African politics is motivated by a desire 
to avoid both the intellectual stupor, which contributes to Africa being viewed 
as a static, generic abstraction, underpinned by western perceptions of modern-
isation routes, and the compensatory trap of idealising pre and post-colonial 
practices. To address these imbalances, my argument is that an Eliasian ap-
proach can provide a more comprehensive and compelling conceptual toolkit to 
enhance understanding in a way that avoids concerns about ‘development stud-
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ies’ and ‘post-colonial discourse’. Although I am critical of the paucity of 
sociological insights, I am mindful of the sensitivities surrounding post-
colonial linguistics and terminology. For this reason, I have shied away from 
applying the most misunderstood concept within the Eliasian canon, namely 
civilisation or civilising. This was a concept Elias applied in a descriptive sense 
and as he explained “I have not been guided by this study by the idea that our 
civilized mode of behaviour is the most advanced of all humanly possible 
modes of behaviour” (Elias 2012, 8). Nevertheless, the preceding manner in 
which the concept had been adopted by colonialists means that any application, 
even within an Eliasian account, would be an unhelpful distraction. The coloni-
al application of ‘civilising’ does however draw together interweaving balances 
(Linklater 2016). For instance, from the early nineteenth century the British 
drive for land rights and commercial opportunities was cloaked in the language 
of civilising. Similarly prominent is the projected altruist sense of purpose of 
enhancing the civilisation of the world and, in particular, the peoples under 
direct and indirect rule (Berger and Weber 2014). To avoid any misguided 
confusion, this paper draws out key criteria within these figurations and pro-
cesses of social development to be found within the work of Elias and figura-
tional sociology. 
3.  A Balanced Approach 
Figurations are networks in which people are bound together through shifting 
patterns of interdependence. People are instrumental through their inter-
relations “forming figurations or networks with each other which connect the 
psychological with the social, or habitus with social relations” (van Krieken 
1998, 49). Crucially habitus is not innate but becomes integral to the individual 
through social processes and learning from birth onwards. Individuals become 
exposed to differing processes which shape behaviour and degrees of self-
restraint and foresight in accordance with standards of the period and habitus. 
Hence people learn self-control and drives “according to the pattern and extent 
of socially given drive and affect regulation” (Elias 1980, 202). Within figura-
tions there are constraints placed upon violence in particular settings and 
against particular people. And there can be instances when constraints are 
much weaker within certain contexts, especially during periods of insecurity 
and uncertainty. In the remainder of the paper I argue that the likelihood of 
democracy contributing to violence is partly dependent on the figurations, the 
length and levels of differentiation and integration between peoples within 
chains of interdependence that draw them together and apart. Shorter, narrower 
levels are less likely to enable interrelationships which could encourage wider 
consideration and empathy while restricting opportunities to mobilise electoral 
support through scaremongering concerning the threat of the ‘other’. 
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To help illuminate the levels of interdependency at key stages of democratic 
processes in Africa I draw upon Wouters’ (2014) interconnected balances 
which underpins Elias’ ‘triad of controls’ which are considered to be integral to 
social development. The triad are three fundamental controls of people in so-
ciety, namely humans over extra-human natural events, people over each other 
and control of each person over him or herself. Wouters proposes seven inter-
connected balances that in conjunction with the triad help to summarise social 
development. Balances are  
conceptual instruments for determining relations, tensions and conflicts be-
tween two or more connected entities, of one or more balances – and on all 
existing or relevant levels of integration, from the level of individuals and 
small groups to humanity at large (ibid).  
Hence these balances open a window on changes in the size and density of 
networks of interdependencies (figurations) and enables insight into level of 
differentiation and integration. These insights provide indications of changes in 
levels of functional and social differentiation and integration. 
The seven balances are: competition and cooperation; external social and 
self-controls; power and dependence; formalisation and informalisation; lust-
balance of lust and intimacy; the we-I balance and; involvement and detach-
ment 
Although the balances are interrelated, in this paper for the sake of brevity, I 
want to draw out common explanations for democratic failures under the rubric 
of power and dependency. However, because I consider that focussing on poli-
tics in isolation can only, at best, provide partial insights I will apply the inter-
twining balances of competition and cooperation and We/I in pursuit of a more 
rounded understanding. 
4.  Power and Dependency 
Across this balance power and dependency relations feature between regions, 
states, social classes, genders and generations. Functional democratisation is 
integral, indicating trends towards stronger and higher levels of competition 
and cooperation within more expanding and tighter interdependencies. These 
more equal power relations entail pressures and initiatives for more reciprocal 
controls between and within groups (Wouters 2016). When this insight is ap-
plied say for example to religion, the size of the gap in power relations between 
religious groups helps to explain the nature of their relations. Hence it can be 
large power gaps, rather than closer, that result in weaker restraints between 
groups. And when applied to some African contexts, emphasis on communal 
ethnic loyalties can restrict inter group working and agreements. 
Wouters (2014) explains how decolonisation and the emancipation of work-
ers, women, gays, children and old people implied shifting power balances and 
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a more inclusive consideration of the needs, and desires of others, within net-
works or webs of interdependence. Nation-states with greater centralisation of 
power over taxation, and the means and use of violence, contributed to the 
development of longer and more complex chains of social and economic inter-
dependence. These more tightly knit webs of interdependence provide links 
between previously disparate groups. The figurations also contribute to greater 
pressure towards the more peaceful regulation of conduct within, and between, 
interdependent groups. To understand contemporary figurations within con-
temporary African societies the starting point is to return in history. 
4.1  Colonial and Post-Colonial Power and Dependency 
Colonialism tended to concentrate on economically productive or strategically 
important regions. Control was implemented by a ‘thin white line’ of adminis-
trators whose reach was restricted to particular trades and regions with state 
infrastructure and penetration otherwise weak. Local Africans were employed 
to support the administrative apparatus. Many were involved in imposing law 
and regulations, able to utilise these intermediate positions between colonialists 
and indigenous population. Because of their centrality to the imposition of 
power, chiefs and elites were engaged whom could be trusted to conform. 
Indeed, conformity became a key basis for awarding and maintaining positions 
resulting in questionable decisions both in ill-suited appointments and remov-
ing people from posts on non-competency grounds. 
In the build-up to independence, a sense of national identity provided collec-
tive consciousness. However, this allegiance was shallow, lacking universal 
support for norms and values within contested boundaries. And although indig-
enous governments initially had popular mandates, they lacked frameworks 
through which disputes could be resolved constitutionally rather than through 
violence. Alongside the rhetoric of independence surrounding self-
determination and freedom were constraints from the past, the institutional and 
structural legacies of colonialism (Berger and Weber 2014). In other words, the 
new nation-states were built on colonial foundations (Chatterjee 1986). Moreo-
ver, the lack both of preceding representative relationships, and opposition 
between colonial governments and people, meant there was no history of polit-
ical engagement and limited connections with civil society. Trust and shared 
political values had not emerged between elite and masses or between different 
ethnic groups with alternative forms of conflict regulation and resolution. Both 
limited experience of oppositional politics and preparation meant that the colo-
nial ‘intermediates’ were in advantageous positions to secure power when post-
independence elections were held. However, the function of mediating unity 
among ethnic groups against colonial power ended with the leaders’ transition 
to state power. 
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With weak national identities, elected members in the winner takes all sys-
tem could mobilise sufficient support through ethnic maths, appealing to the 
largest ‘tribe’ or enough groups to reach the electoral threshold. In so doing 
ethnicity and concomitant exclusion became the basis for political identifica-
tion as areas for differentiation and explanation that resonated with potential 
supporters (Lynch and Crawford 2011, Mann 2005, Thomson 2016). An ‘eth-
nic state’ emerged that privileges one ethnic group over others (Mengisteab 
2007) and the management of tensions and conflict allowed permeable inclu-
sionary boundaries that enable the co-optation of vocal and influential oppo-
nents into power and business circles (Omeje 2006). 
After an initial burst of democratic activity Thomson (2016) explores how 
leaders put forward a range of reasons for the subsequent ‘postponement’ of 
elections including space in which to build democracy (Tanzania), elections 
were too divisive along ethnic lines (Ghana) or that only a one party state could 
enable long term economic development otherwise prevented by short term 
electioneering (Cooper 2002). Following the contraction of democracy, relying 
on conforming groups for support reinforced ethnicity as the most binding of 
wider group relations. In the process ethnicity became the basis for career 
development and political involvement. Factionalisation of the state through 
this neopatrimonialism increased the risk of instability. For example, uncon-
trollable crises, such as resource shortage, have contributed to rulers being “no 
longer able to assert their dominance over local strongmen in their patronage 
networks” (Reno 2007, 328-9). 
Neo patrimonial regimes are considered to be hybrids combining legal-
rational bureaucracies and personalised clientalism and patronage. They have 
been described variously as ‘defective democracy’ (Merkel 2004) or ‘electoral’ 
or ‘competitive authoritarianism’ (Levitsky and Way 2002). Through the mo-
tions of democratic processes and factional arrangements, state institutions can 
sustain patrons and supporters at the expense of opponents who are deliberately 
weakened. Bureaucracy lacks independence, with posts based upon nepotism 
and compliance. Hence biases within neo-patrimonialism, rather than profes-
sionalism, determined participatory inclusion and the basis for reward, political 
prominence and status. A lack of majority support for government can stem 
from neopatrimonialism and factionalism for whom the military provide armed 
underpinning. This reliance on the military in order to maintain power prevents 
greater integration and mutual empathy across populations which, as I explain 
later in the paper, hinder development of cooperation and self-controls. 
Chabal and Deloz (1999) outline how formal structures have been ill-suited 
to concealing patrimonial and particularist forms of power. Colonial weakness 
of bureaucracy coincided with personalised nature of status and prestige that 
underpinned the basis for individual power. The system can attract and main-
tain supporters, providing politicians deliver benefits to communities such as 
jobs, cash and infrastructure. These people consider themselves to be included 
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within the neo-patrimonial framework which they will support rather than risk 
losing their advantage within an alternative arrangement. 
Power became personalised with the state lacking robust institutionalisation 
to monitor and challenge. For instance, Mueller (2011) has argued that democ-
racy needs integrity of the rule of law and institutions which must be matched 
by how they operate. However, the tremendous incentives to retain power and 
access to resources leads to a deliberate further weakening of safeguarding 
institutions and law. In the Kenyan build up to the 2007 elections, leaders had 
centralised power at the expense of judiciary, parliament and civil service and 
made partisan appointments. Consequently, the necessary checks and balances 
were either not in place or had been undermined. Without a vibrant civil socie-
ty, government accountability to people proved weak enabling powerholders to 
act in their own, and their patronage networks’ interests, rather than those of 
the nation. The limited depth of national identifications can partly be explained 
by the restricted ideological narratives that accompany sub-Saharan African 
politics. 
4.2  Weak Political Discursive Consciousness 
From the onset of post-colonial independence, ideological debate and alle-
giances has been notable mainly for their absence. With some notable excep-
tions such as the Tanzanian leader Julius Nyerere’s emphasis on African social-
ism, early Presidents positioned themselves first and foremost as fathers of the 
nation whom the population should depend, love, obey and/or fear. Yet as I 
explained above, the nation was a concept which had yet to be embedded with-
in national consciousness resulting in the instrumental scramble for ethnic 
coalitions (Mann 2005). As Scarrit (1993) argues, there is low ideological 
intensity within most sub-Saharan African politics. The upshot of the loosely 
rooted discursive consciousness is that elections are not fought over metanarra-
tives and debate surrounding societal goals and development. Instead election-
eering focuses upon the distribution of resources and who is best placed to 
administer. The approach thinly hides the anticipated outcome that the winner’s 
ethnic group or constituency community will receive a greater share of ‘in-
vestment’ and employment opportunities. Incumbents have a distinct ad-
vantage, with greater access to resources. By comparison oppositional parties 
have to overcome being numerically weak, fragmented and often leader per-
sonality focussed as they seek to overcome their institutional weaknesses of 
being both outside power and resource allocation (Rakner and van de Walle 
2009). At the time of writing, the Kenyan elections are six months away. Elec-
tioneering is dominated by Big Men’s personalities, which the two leading 
protagonists inherited from their more charismatic fathers, and claims and 
counter claims over revenue, corruption and governance. Political vision on 
how to address wider systemic developmental problems remains buried in the 
HSR 42 (2017) 4  │  178 
scramble for the formula to win the ethnic maths competition. Instead of ap-
pealing to individuals, communal narratives intertwine democracy with ethno-
regional divisions that continue to resonate in other locations. For instance, in 
South Sudan democratic elections were quickly followed by civil fractures that 
share striking similarities with other experiences in Africa over the last fifty 
years. 
4.3  South Sudanese Power and Dependence 
South Sudan formed in 2011 following the long Sudanese civil war, ostensibly 
between the north and southern parts, within the then national boundaries of 
Sudan. During the build-up to independence, multi-party elections were held in 
2010. Hopes that the new nation would quickly become a functioning democ-
racy were short-lived. As Zambakari and Kang (2014) explain, the national 
government “did not develop into a strong democracy that adequately meets 
the needs of its citizens”. With weak governance arrangements alongside recent 
history of political violence and insecurities, stemming in part from conflicts 
within the nation state, at the onset the likelihood of a successful plebiscite was 
slight. The new government quickly centralised, denying political space for 
diversity and alternative allegiances. Moreover, as de Waal (2014) points out, 
the newly installed government was able to utilise previous patronage arrange-
ments. These networks had become vastly enriched since 2005 when the end of 
the civil war enabled a huge increase in oil revenue. With tokenistic govern-
ance arrangements President Kiir rewarded compliant loyal followers through 
opening up corruption opportunities along ethnic lines. Today South Sudan is 
ranked one of the lowest countries in the Transparency Corruption Index. 
Post-independence fighting followed already established boundaries. Prior 
to independence Hutchinson (2001) outlined an attempted coup in 1991 against 
the Southern leader Garang’s attempt to win the war for Sudan rather than 
making the fight about independence for the South region. The dispute led to 
military confrontation between the Nuer and Dinka, the two largest South Su-
danese groups. Pinaud (2014) notes that within South Sudan the Dinka consti-
tute roughly 1/3rd population and the Nuer equate to approximately 1/5th with 
other ethnic groups marginalised. 
5.  Competition and Cooperation 
Although focusing ostensibly on power the above analysis is indicative of the 
interweaving with other balances surrounding competition over resources and 
collective identifications. All are instrumental in the likelihood that democracy 
will contribute to peaceful power sharing or violence in the name of (some) 
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people. The remainder of the paper explores in greater depth two of the most 
interconnected balances, namely competition and cooperation and We/I. 
Competition and cooperation draws together Elias’ focus upon the interplay 
between the use of physical violence and taxation. When central authority 
power is weak, there are challenges to centralised control in different locations 
including localised competitive struggles for land. In these locations weaker 
social and self-controls and potential outbreaks of conflict and criminal vio-
lence restrict business investment and undermine transport and communication 
networks. With limited investment outwith the region, and national and interna-
tional markets restricted by uncertainty and underdeveloped networks, the local 
economy tends to be informal, small scale artisan or subsistence farming. Wide 
ranging, complex divisions of labour or trade do not materialise. Consequently, 
levels of cooperation are ambivalent shaped by the scale of webs of interde-
pendence. 
When applying Elias’ coupling of violence and taxation, the proportion of 
tax payers within many African countries is noticeably low. From the initial 
introduction in the African colonies onwards the payment of monetary taxes 
has been unpopular. When first introduced many of the indigenous farming 
populations had to change their practices. To recoup money to pay taxes meant 
shifting from subsistence to cash crops. This approach resulted in localised 
food shortages, malnutrition and sometimes famine. Changes to agriculture 
continued following independence. Countries specialised in one export crop 
contributing to over reliance on Western markets and price setting. Crop fail-
ures or global overproduction had devastating impacts on national economics, 
constraining resources to invest in economic diversification. The shortage of 
monetary resources led to largescale government borrowing which in turn 
created unserviceable massive national debts. Some governments invested 
money into nationalisation programmes that proved inefficient and were to 
prove integral to the patronage and neo-patrimonialism channels that also per-
vaded politics. 
With limited resources and distribution priorities directed into neo-
patrimonial networks, government service provision was patchy, especially in 
more remote regions where social controls were also weakly applied. In these 
locations informal economies are particularly prominent across economic and 
social spectrums to include food, water, health, fuel, housing transport, finance 
and telecommunications. The neglect of more sparsely populated regions meant 
that despite agriculture being the mainstay of national income, investment was 
directed at urban projects at the expense of rural areas. Cooper (2002) argues 
that often this policy was partly directed at limiting the resources of a potential-
ly conservative opposition which could be translated into political strength. 
Moreover, prioritising cheap food for urban areas meant that governments paid 
artificially low rates for crops and farmers struggled to survive. The disparity 
contributed to growing urbanisation and farming becoming less attractive. In 
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one of the most extreme examples, Ajakaiye et al. (2011) explain how the 
vibrant agriculture in Nigeria during the mid-twentieth century declined to such 
an extent that the sector was virtually abandoned. Although contemporary 
urban migrants retain localised roots, the majority tend to be located within 
informal settlements where they share neighbourhoods with people from simi-
lar backgrounds and ethnicity. Lynch and Crawford (2011, 289) position indig-
enous migrants within the ‘politics of belonging’ that enable political elites and 
‘ethnic entrepreneurs’ to ‘exploit an almost naturalized sense of belonging and 
histories of precarious migrant labour policies’. 
Potentialities for spreading levels of cooperation were to be further hit when 
structural adjustment programmes (SAP) were introduced in many African 
states during the 1980s. These states had been unable to adapt and accommo-
date global shifts. The most notable change was the 1973 dramatic hike in oil 
price. This increase impacted upon plans for fuel driven industrial programmes 
and contributed to worldwide recession, lowering prices and demand for prima-
ry exports. With national governments facing massive debts, loans from inter-
national institutions, such as the World Bank and IMF, were dependent upon 
the implementation of neo-liberal reforms. These initiatives included privatisa-
tion which saw the contraction of the public sector and the removal of tariffs 
for import substitution industries (Berger and Weber 2014, Cooper 2014, 
Thomson 2016). Klay Kieh (2009, 19) describes how financial institutions 
insisted that governments, 
remove all of the barriers to trade and foreign investment; to devalue their cur-
rencies; to lay off workers in the public sector; to freeze employment; to keep 
wages in the public sector stagnant; to raise interest rate[s] and to dismantle 
their ‘social safety nets’. 
Massive job losses followed and chains of mutual interdependence contracted. 
Health and social institutions closed while educational opportunities contract-
ed. Anticipated international investments, that would accommodate significant 
portions of populations, subsequently failed to materialise. Instead investment 
tended to concentrate upon urban pockets or continued to be directed at prima-
ry resources. As Cooper (2002, 101) explains, industrialisation requires reliable 
communications, utilities, company linkages and skilled labour. However, the 
implementation of SAP conditions weakened all these requirements. Le Billon 
(2007) comments upon the growing distance between elites and people, a gap 
which was not hidden by an inclusive social safety net for the expanding poor. 
The contraction most adversely affected young people many of whom became 
involved in the informal economy. For instance in Kibera, the massive informal 
Kenyan settlement where violence was pronounced in 2008, 60% of residents 
are youth and 80% of residents are jobless or involved in very sporadic infor-
mal economic activities (Dimova 2010). The youth were also willing recruits to 
Big Men networks of patronage, across different layers of political influence, 
receiving payment for tasks such as mobilising support. Again highlighting the 
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interplay between power, competition and cooperation, privatisation provided 
tremendous opportunities for Big Men to profit through the accumulation of 
shares. In turn the shares could be utilised to strengthen political control. 
Today, around 72% of working populations rely on the informal sector 
characterised by low wages and productivity and limited regulation and taxa-
tion (Benjamin et al. 2014). Rather than figurations extending to incorporate 
more and more people, the reverse happened through sector decline and market 
contraction. Consequently, contact between people engaged within the informal 
economy and the nation-state, surrounding contributions and expectations, has 
been further weakened. Moreover, within the informal economy, connections, 
rather than qualifications or abilities, became even more paramount. Familial 
connections were the route into urban opportunities, while providing necessary 
cover for rural lands left behind. And in a manner similar to other parts of the 
world, especially the Middle East, the contraction of state sponsored social 
services created gaps in provision which other groups, most notably religious 
organisations, moved into. Therefore, mutual competition and cooperation that 
underpin informal economies do not stem directly from structured government 
policies. Instead the informal economy is heavily shaped through networks 
with boundaries that allow and exclude participation. 
As the expanded opportunities for the Big Men implies, the privatisation 
agenda was not accompanied by rigorous governance arrangements. Limited 
governance continues to help shape levels of competition and cooperation and 
interconnected allegiances. For example, the same processes which enabled 
voting abuses in Kenya also enabled corruption and land grabbing exercises. In 
2007 with no agreed independent arbitrator or trusted mechanisms for appeal 
people resorted to the streets and violence. Similarly in the newly independent 
South Sudan the weakly developed institutions of government and overreliance 
on oil revenues and international aid agencies meant that there were very few 
constitutional checks on the distribution of revenue (de Waal 2014, Pinaud 
2014). Instead arrangements created within war continued in the post war dy-
namics. SPLA commanders shaped their own economic and social capital 
through patronage networks which enabled a trickling down of resources to 
incorporate supporters. Like some other forms of politics found in neighbour-
ing countries, ideology beyond independence was weakly formulated with 
personal wealth accumulation a more integral part of political and military 
arrangements. Without the goal of independence to unify southern groups, the 
government extended ‘solidaristic graft’ to try ensure a sufficient proportion of 
the population were incorporated within the self-interested distribution chain. 
Today shortfalls in agricultural production, exacerbated by fighting that has 
interrupted main trade routes with Uganda, has further reducing inter group 
cooperation. In the process access to food, associated supply chains and ulti-
mately famine has been politicised. 
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Following the implementation of international constraints on sub Saharan 
African government’s sovereignty, the further expansion of globalisation has 
created uneven opportunities (Berger and Weber 2014). Greater fluidity of 
manufacturing has resulted in corporations locating to African locations when 
conditions are deemed favourable. The tremendous expansion of mobile 
phones does offer greater potential to overcome this gap. However, technology 
that enables the transfer of production is also exclusionary with internet con-
nections and computer equipment often beyond the reach of the majority of 
African populations. Moreover, global mutual interdependencies, while indicat-
ing a shift towards greater, expansive interconnections, remain unstable. Rela-
tionships are stacked in favour of large corporations who can withdraw their 
businesses when better opportunities are perceived elsewhere. Consequently, 
global economic liberalisation and national adaptation programmes have failed 
to formally accommodate large sections of African populations. Instead Lewis 
(2008) reports on the lag between overall economic performance and localised 
experiences. 
Ironically after numerous Western attempts to initiate and re-introduce de-
mocracy within African nations, one of the unintended consequences of SAP 
was the manner in which Big Men selected democracy as the means of main-
taining power. Facing devastating damage caused to public institutions and 
with reduced resources to fund sufficiently inclusive patronage networks the 
purpose of the Big Men was under threat. In particular declining numbers of 
citizens believed that national best interests dominated political agendas. The 
partiality of policies became too restricted with disproportionate sections of 
populations mistrusting and questioning government legitimacy. Moreover, the 
Big Men no longer had the resources to fulfil their main purpose of continued 
power through levels of communally derived mutual interdependencies. In 
these settings Thomson (2016) outlines how leaders turned to democracy as a 
way to re-legitimise and restore trust in their institutions. Hence this ‘second 
independence’ or ‘Third wave’ was because, 
parties often grew, not out of socio-economic cleavages or struggles over the 
nature of state authority, but out of elites’ urgent need for electoral vehicles 
which would allow them to compete in the newly devised rules of the political 
game (Manning 2005, 715). 
Many of the former autocrats proved adept with the new rules of the game, 
often changing the rules to enhance their prospects while proceedings were still 
tinged by the veneer of democracy. And some leaders played the game fairly 
and won. The continuation of preceding leaders is highlighted in Lynch and 
Crawford’s (2011) study of legislative elections in twenty-one countries. Be-
tween 1989 and 2007, there were only five instances where the incumbent 
President failed to be elected. However, playing to the rules of democracy and 
creating ethnic divisions can be two sides of the same coin. 
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6.  We/I 
The We/I balance explores levels of identification within individuals and 
groups. In essence, the interplay is between levels of individualisation and 
forms of group-feeling such as ethnicity, gender, religion and class. Expanding 
group-feeling or widening we-identification to the levels of nation weakened 
other We forms such as class, ethnicity and religion. Personal identity is an 
interweaving of individual history with intergenerational heritage and commu-
nal events. This intertwining can provide the basis for ethnic, religious, region-
al and socio-economic loyalties and hatreds which become embedded within 
habitus. These shared experiences and common memories are integral both to 
forms of I and We feelings, shared senses of truth and empathy and the bound-
aries for exclusion. When forms of civil society identification coalesce around 
religion, race, class or ethnicity such feelings can weaken the sense of national 
identification, most obviously if the nation-state is controlled by a different 
race, class or ethnic group. In locations where the state is relatively weak or 
only strong in concentrated areas, civil society can replicate wider fractures. 
However, with limited discursive consciousness, counter claims tend to reverse 
the established policies and behaviour. Rather than promoting widespread and 
deep rooted systemic change, excluded groups coordinate campaigns around 
the basis for their exclusion, whether ethnicity or religion, and in so doing set 
the parameters for inclusion. In Africa, Dowden (2009) has argued that the lack 
of common nationhood has been the chief cause of wars. Drawing upon the 
example of South Sudan, following Garang’s failure to solidify opposition 
around a united Sudanese identity, the South Sudanese collaboration was to be 
dominated by Dinka leadership with rival ethnic groups marginalised. Follow-
ing independence this arrangement continued. 
Potential forms of alternative identification and senses of belonging are mul-
tiple. At the continental level, pan Africanism has taken various shapes and 
ideological undertones, including socialist during 1930 and 1940s (Berger and 
Weber 2014). Cooper (2002) highlights the significance of the diaspora in 
raising a sense of collective African identity. Today African organisations such 
as the African Union drive for economic and political unity in shared areas of 
interest with limited impact. Yet despite the tremendous variations in language, 
ethnicities, religion, cultural practice and geography, a sense of being African 
pervades sub Saharan habitus. Conversely at a national level in Nigeria, one of 
the most diverse nations, emerged out of 250 ethnicities and has over 400 lan-
guages and dialects and cross cutting religions. 
Within African societies identities ‘incorporate a communal notion of the 
individual’ providing sense of intensity (Chabal and Daloz 1999, 52). In so 
doing, identities contribute to politics being both inclusive and exclusive. The 
roots for the interweaving were pointed out in approaches to independence by 
Sir Henry Willink Commissioner from the Nigerian British Colonial Office 
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when referring to a ‘sharp recrudescence of tribal feeling’ (cited in Bourne 
2015: 82). And these feelings enable politicians to exploit communal loyalties. 
Nevertheless, as Chabal and Daloz (1999) explain the relationship is interde-
pendent. Politicians tend to respect psychological, social and religious founda-
tions of their local community. The connections are acknowledged within 
patronage relationships that accord with shared ethnic identifications and prior-
ities. 
To apply an earlier point explicitly to We/I, at independence newly formed 
governments clothed themselves in nationalist garbs, irrespective of the ideolo-
gy adopted, whether African or scientific socialism or state capitalism (Thom-
son 2016). Although in the short term this approach brought some stability and 
sense of unity, the same nationalist rhetoric could also be the basis on which 
potential opponents could challenge. By claiming the nation as their own and 
denouncing public criticism to be against the nation, governments reduced the 
space in which oppositional groups could operate. Therefore, when the opposi-
tion considered that the government’s national vision was too exclusionary, 
through patronage loyalties, then ethnicity was the main source of oppositional 
identification to be mobilised around, what Osaghae (2006, 4-5) describes as, 
“counter-mobilization and counter-nationalism”. 
Following the achievement of the nationalist goal, subsequent attempts to 
create national consciousness have been weakened by the continuation and 
mobilising reinforcement of ethnic identities. These difficulties stem in part 
from the limited shared symbols, common memories and mythology which, 
Smith (1991) argued, are essential for the successful emergence of a nation-
state. Cooper (2002) outlines attempts to accord cultures with distinctly nation-
al characters that sought to separate dress, music and art from local connec-
tions. During the 1980s cultural diversity mushroomed, especially among 
younger generations, as music, literature and art become more particularistic 
forms of expression and means of portraying forms of opposition to more ster-
ile, national adaptations. Religion also became a more evident form of shared 
consciousness across Christian and Islamic denominations in particular, ex-
tending footholds from the spiritual to the secular. Conversely narrow focussed 
economic programmes contributed to the emergence of small, marginalised 
working classes. Moreover, the expansion of the informal economy further 
restricted work forms of We allegiances. 
7.  Conclusion 
After decades of northern hemisphere critics bemoaning the state of Africa, 
there are many signs of progress that both support and confound ‘development 
studies’ and ‘post-colonial discourse’. Life expectancies are rising, connected 
to cleaner water, sanitation, healthcare, education programmes and employ-
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ment opportunities in a manner which supports development studies while 
challenging the post-colonial critical base. However, these changes are not 
universal varying both between and within nation-states. These differences and 
their impacts tend to be better explained by post-colonial discourse rather than 
development studies. The extent of raising life expectations correlates with 
strategic economic and political investments into commerce, peoples and re-
gions. Losers in the growth game tend to be non-strategic industries or loca-
tions with people who are not prioritised by governing parties. Moreover, the 
dominance of informal economies means very low levels of taxation, thereby 
weakening the interdependencies between state and civilians. The upshot of 
these weak links into formal, wide ranging networks is that opportunities for 
greater cooperation between peoples from other communal groups and regions 
are sparse. Consequently, the conditions that enable shifts from competition to 
cooperation are largely absent or weakly formed. Following on from this 
weakness is the concomitant impact on levels of mutual interdependence. 
The application of figurational sociology enables greater insight into devel-
opment programmes and the patchy implementation of democracy that the 
positioning of development and post-colonial studies cannot fully explain. 
Thirty years of neo-liberalism have contributed to the introduction of the third 
wave of democracy and subsequent reinforcement of power and competition. 
Rather than result in an opening up of mutual interdependencies across popula-
tions, the changes have not significantly shifted levels of empathy between 
previously demarcated groups. Nor has the third wave addressed endemic 
problems, often traceable to colonialism, which continue to reverberate. In 
other words the losers of democracy are also losers in the division of economic 
and power resources. They are outsiders across power and competition and 
cooperation balances. Their social and individual characteristics provide both 
the basis for their collective identification and the grounds for their exclusion. 
Heightened emotional involvement is integral within ‘We’ outsider identities 
that are denied open participation. Conversely the established We are threat-
ened by opening participation to outsiders (Elias and Scotson 2008). By view-
ing democratic processes through multi-layered prisms of balances, problems 
are identified that are more deep rooted. Hence potential solutions must be 
more wide ranging, capable of overcoming shifting patterns of compartmental-
ism and weak mutual empathy. Hitherto existing processes interact and rein-
force existing inequalities. Interconnected balances also highlight how political 
and economic opportunities and constraints will continue to be intertwined 
until there is greater accountability, stability and confidence that the current 
‘winners’ will not lose everything in more open, inclusive democratic and 
competitive arrangements. With less power orientated around We identifica-
tions, power differentials will diminish, and mutual interdependency between 
groups will increase and functional democratisation would become more equi-
table. 
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In summary, democratic processes are less likely to contribute to deadly 
outcomes if they are positioned within a multi-balanced change agenda that 
alters relationships between and within groups. Achieving shifts towards great-
er pacification therefore requires greater interweaving of competition and co-
operation and power and dependency within wider figurations and more shared 
We identifications. The outcome will be a concomitant increase in mutual 
belonging and decline in mutual suspicion and fear that embedding democracy 
requires. 
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